Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Glade Terry and Kairle Terry v. C. William Bacon,
M.D.; Central Utah Clinic, P.C., and Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott Williams; Brian S. Platt; Strong and Hanni; Attorney for Defendant.
James C. Haskins; Thomas N. Thompson; Haskins and Associates LLC; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Terry v. Bacon, No. 20100893 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2595

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GLADE TERRY and KAIRLE TERRY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Appellate Court No. 20100893-CA

C. WILLIAM BACON, M.D.; CENTRAL
UTAH CLINIC, P.C, and UTAH VALLEY
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendants and Appellees.

District Court No. 070402917

(Oral Argument Requested)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment entered by the
Fourth Judicial District, Court
In and For Utah County, State of Utah
Honorable Samuel McVey

Scott Williams (#3498)
BriantS. Piatt (#11819)
STRONG &HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508

James C. Haskins (#1406)
Thomas N. Thompson (#3243)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
136 East South Temple, Suite 1420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)539-0234
Facsimile: (801) 539-5210

vtftf*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

&&*

\A

<0

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GLADE TERRY and KAIRLE TERRY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
Appellate Court No. 20100893-CA
C. WILLIAM BACON, M.D.; CENTRAL
UTAH CLINIC, P.C, and UTAH VALLEY
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendants and Appellees.

District Court No. 070402917

(Oral Argument Requested)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a judgment entered by the
Fourth Judicial District Court
In and For Utah County, State of Utah
Honorable Samuel McVey

Scott Williams (#3498)
BriantS. Piatt (#11819)
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801)596-1508

James C. Haskins (#1406)
Thomas N. Thompson (#3243)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
136 East South Temple, Suite 1420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0234
Facsimile: (801) 539-5210

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

..

ii

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FORREVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

2

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

2

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

16

ARGUMENT

18

CONCLUSION

31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

32

ADDENDUM
A.

ORDER on Defendant's Supplemental Briefing in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Dismissal
of Case, entered September 30,2011.

B.

ORDER Enforcing Settlement Agreement, entered on June 22, 2010.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer,
111 S.W.3d 346 (Ark. 2003)

29

Am Trim L.L.C v. Oracle Corp.,
383 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2004)

30

Buffalo Wings Factory, Inc. v. Mohd,
622 F. Supp.2d 325 (E. D. Va. 2007)

21,22

DCH Holdings, LLC v. Neilsen,
220 P.3d 178, 183 fn. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 2009)

27

Doe v. Marat,
984 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1999)

1,19

Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources (USA), Inc.
801 P.2d909, 911)Utah 1990

1

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc.,
332 F.3d 976, 977 (6th Cir. 2003)

19

In re Foot Barn Stores, Inc.,
107 F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 1997)

29

Kaufmann v. Kaufmann,
934 So.2d 1073, 1079 (Ala. Ct. App. 2005)

19

McBride v. Jones,
615 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1980)

1

Patella v. State,
294 S.W. 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927)

21

Reese v. Tingey Construction,
111 P.3d 605 (Utah 2008)

1,16,21,23,24

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Russo v. Nagal,
817 A.2d426, 433 (N. J. Super A.D. 2003)

19

Shrong v. Farmer's & Merchants' State Bank,
70 N.W.2d 907, 910 (N.D. 1955)

20

State v. Jeffries,
893 N.E.2d 487 (Ohio 2008)

20

United Oklahoma Bank v. Moss,
793 P.2d 1359, 1364 (Okla 1990)

29

Upjohn Co. V. United States,
449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981)

19

Young Candy & Tobacco Co v. Montoya,
372 P.2d 703, 707 (Ariz. 1962)

29

Statutes (Utah)
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-l(5)(a) (2010)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b- 8

21

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-137

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-203(2)(b) (2008)

21

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-101, etseq. (2008)

25

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-110 (2008)

25

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b)

22

Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 504

1,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rule 504(d)

19

Rule 504(d)(3)

20

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-103(2)G) (2009).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Whether the District Court erred in determining that the attorney-

client privilege between the Plaintiffs and their former attorney herein was
properly waived, allowing their former attorney to testify against them and in
support of the Respondent's position that this case was settled and that the
Plaintiffs consented to the alleged settlement.
Standard of Review:

This is a question of law which is reviewed for

correctness. See Doe v. Marat, 984 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1999).
B.

Whether the rule in Reese v. Tingey Construction, 111 P.3d 605 (Utah

2008), refusing to enforce mediated settlements unless those agreements are
reduced to writing, should be extended to apply to this case.
C.

Whether there was any meeting of the minds between the Plaintiffs

and the Respondents herein, such that the Plaintiffs net recovery pursuant to an
alleged settlement amounts to only $64.58.
Standard of Review:

Whether there has been a meeting of the minds

between parties to a contract is a question of fact which is reviewed for clear error.
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O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Utah 1981).
D.

Whether the disparity between the Plaintiffs injuries and the amount

of the alleged settlement is so great as to require a remand to determine whether
that disparity should shock the conscience of the court and allow the Plaintiff
Glade Terry to present his case to the Trial Court on the merits.
Standard of Review:

The Plaintiffs have discovered no case specifically

addressing the standard of review with respect to this issue. But see McBride v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1980) ("[W]here .. . there is substantial likelihood
that the proof may show that a party was so cheated, imposed upon, or unfairly
dealt with that it should shock the conscience of the court to allow it to stand, the
court should resolve doubts in favor of permitting the parties to present their
evidence and have the issues determined.")

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

This is an appeal from the Trial Court's

Orders entered June 22, 2010, and September 30, 2010, which granted the
Respondents' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement.
B.

Course of the Proceedings Below,

This medical malpractice

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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action was commenced on September 26, 2007, wherein the Plaintiff Glade Terry
asserted damages for injuries suffered as the result of back surgery and other
actions of the Respondents herein.1 The Respondents C. William Bacon and
Central Utah Medical Clinic, P.C., did not file an Answer to the Complaint at any
time; but on October 24, 2007, they filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
the Proceedings. On October 26, 2007, the Plaintiffs then attorney, James
McConkie, filed a reply to that Motion conceding "that Plaintiffs do not oppose
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration." Then, on November 9, 2007, the
Plaintiffs and the remaining Respondent in the case, Utah Regional Medical
Center, entered into a Stipulated Motion to Stay Proceedings and to Enforce
Arbitration Agreement. Accordingly, on November 13, 2007, the Court entered an
Order staying the proceedings as to Utah Regional Medical Center and ordering
that the Plaintiffs immediately submit their claims against the Medical Center to
arbitration. So far as Plaintiff is aware, this was never done.

J

The Plaintiffs wife, Kairle Terry, asserted in the same Complaint a cause of
action for loss of consortium, and the Plaintiffs have not appealed the adverse ruling on
that issue. Additionally, during the course of the proceedings, the Plaintiffs informally
raised a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim on behalf of Kairle Terry. The
adverse ruling on that issue has also not been appealed; however, if the Plaintiffs prevail
in this appeal, the consortium claim would also be at issue in any remand to the District
Court because Kairle's consortium claim is "derivative from the cause of action existing
in behalf of the injured person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 (5)(a) (2010).
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One year and four months later, on April 30, 2009, because there had been
no action in the case, the Court entered its Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Case.
On May 11, 2009, the Plaintiffs' original counsel, Mr. McConkie, filed a statement
with the court stating that the case was still active but also indicated that the
Plaintiffs were seeking new counsel. Mr. McConkie simultaneously withdrew
from the case.
Subsequently, on August 21, 2009, the Respondents C. William Bacon and
Central Utah Clinic filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement with the
Court and, on May 10, 2010, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on whether the
Plaintiffs had, in fact, agreed to settle their case for the sum of $15,000. The Court
found that they had, and entered its Order dated June 22, 2010, disposing of the
malpractice claims of the Plaintiff Glade Terry. The remaining issues in the case
with respect to Plaintiff Kairle Terry were resolved adversely to her in the Court's
subsequent Order dated September 30, 2010. This appeal followed.
C.

Statement of Facts2.

1.

Over a prolonged period of time, Plaintiff Glade Terry experienced

2

The pertinent allegations in the Complaint are set forth verbatim. The
Defendants C. William Bacon and Central Utah Clinic, P.C., filed no answer at any time
during the course of the proceedings. The Defendant Utah Valley Medical Center filed
an Answer denying the material allegations of the Complaint, and the case against that
Defendant was ordered to proceed to arbitration.
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consistent right sciatic nerve pain and other back and leg pain for which he sought
medical treatment, pain medications, and nerve block injections. (Complaint, ^ 6;
R. 7)
2.

Plaintiffs treating physician, Defendant C. William Bacon, M.D.,

advised the Plaintiff to undergo back surgery to relieve the pain. (Complaint, *[[ 7;
R. 7)
3.

On or about October 17, 2005, the Plaintiff Glade Terry was admitted

to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for surgery. Defendant William Bacon,
M. D., performed an L5-S1 right sided discectomy, transforaminal lumbar
interbody fusion with complete unroofing foraminotomy. (Complaint, f 8; R.. 67)

•

4.

•

Following the surgery, Plaintiff Glade Terry reported to Defendant C.

William Bacon, M.D., that he was experiencing significant buttocks and leg pain.
Defendants William C. Bacon, M.D., Central Utah Clinic and Utah Valley
Regional Medical Clinic failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff Glade Terry's
physical complaints and take appropriate medical interventions for a period of
about six weeks. As time progressed, the pain became more severe, and Plaintiff
Glade Terry permanently lost sensation and motion in his lower extremities,
particularly on his right side. (Complaint, <[{ 9, R. 6)
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5.

Thereafter, Plaintiff Glade Terry was referred to the University of

Utah Medical Center where he was attended to by John Braun, M.D. Plaintiff was
diagnosed with extraordinary weakness in the right quadricep and distally in the
lower extremity. He was also diagnosed with significant pain and paresthesias
globally in the right leg. (Complaint, ]f 10; R. 6)
6.

Based upon the foregoing symptoms, John Braun, M.D., and his

colleagues determined that the bone graft performed by Defendant C. William
Bacon, M.D., surrounding Plaintiffs nerve root in the foramen and extraforaminal area may be causing Plaintiffs paralysis, physical symptoms and pain.
(Complaint, 111, R. 6)
7.

Plaintiff Glade Terry underwent a revision surgery of his L5-S1 on or

about December 19, 2005 and thereafter was discharged to rehabilitation in hopes
that Plaintiff would regain increased mobility and function. (Complaint, f 12; R.
5)
8.

Post-surgery, Plaintiff Glade Terry continued to experience

permanent paralysis in his right lower extremities for which he uses a brace for
foot drop. He also suffers from severe and unrelenting pain in his lower right
extremities. (Complaint, ^f 13; R. 5)
9.

The Defendants herein failed to perform the October, 2005 surgery
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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properly.

After the surgery, Defendants failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff

Glade Terry's physical condition. Thereafter, they failed to timely recommend
appropriate interventions; and otherwise failed to meet the acceptable standards of
care. (Complaint, f 16; R. 4-5)
10.

All Defendants herein asserted reliance on the Plaintiff Glade Terry' s

agreement to submit this dispute to arbitration, and by Order filed November 13,
2007, the Court ordered the proceedings stayed as to Defendant Utah Regional
Medical Center, and ordered that the Plaintiffs "shall immediately submit their
claims against Defendant Utah Regional Medical Center to binding arbitration
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act...". (R. 20, 27, 30)
11.

On April 30, 2009, the Court issued its Notice of Intent to Dismiss

this case for lack of activity. (R. 46)
12.

On May 11, 2009, Plaintiffs' former counsel, James McConkie, filed

his withdrawal as counsel for the Plaintiff. (R. 48)
13.

On August 21, 2009, the Defendants C. William Bacon and Central

Utah Clinic filed a motion with the court to enforce an alleged settlement
agreement between those Defendants and the Plaintiffs. (R. 63) The Defendants
alleged that the Plaintiffs' former attorney, James McConkie, had accepted on
behalf of the Plaintifffs the sum of $15,000 as "a complete settlement and
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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resolution of the Plaintiffs claims against Dr. Bacon and Central Utah Clinic."
(R. 80)
14.

On September 9, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the

motion, asserting, inter alia, that the Plaintiffs did not waive their attorney-client
privilege with respect to communications with attorney James McConkie, and that
they had at no time agreed to settle this case for $ 15,000. (R. 88) The Plaintiffs'
opposition included the Affidavit of Glade Terry, who denied under oath that he at
any time agreed to settle his case for $15,000. (R. 91)
15.

On January 7, 2010, the Plaintiffs' former attorney, James McConkie,

filed an attorney's lien in this action, asserting fees and costs against the Plaintiffs
in the sum of $8,335.00. In addition to such fees and costs, pursuant to the
retainer agreement signed by the Plaintiffs' former attorney and the Plaintiffs,
there was purportedly due and owing from the Plaintiffs an attorney fee in the sum
of $5,000.00 due to a contingent fee arrangement. (R. 107)
16.

At the hearing, prior to hearing any evidence, the Court stated that

"[t]he court finds in this case that at least the proffered facts would be that - on
behalf of the defendant would be that Mr. McConkie had some authority from his
client to accept a $15,000.00 offer. . . . So based on that, I believe the attorneyclient privilege would be lifted . . .". (R. 180 at p. 15)
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17.

Mr. McConkie testified that he first discussed settlement with

Plaintiff Glade Terry in August, 2008. He also testified that, on December 29,
2008, he "explained to client the situation, gave me permission to settle for
$15,000." (R. 180 at 20)
18.

Mr. McConkie also testified in response to a question from the

Plamtiff s new counsel as follows:
Q

Well, isn't it true that there were conversations that you had with the

clients where they had refused to accept the $15,000 and, thus, you did not
propound that agreement to them?
A

I remember speaking with my clients. I remember them telling me

they did not wish to settle. I don't have a recollection about whether I sent them
the document or not. I'd have to check the file and ask my paralegal.
(R. 180 at 24.)

19.

The Plaintiff Kairle Terry testified as follows:

Q

Did your husband ever agree to settle this matter for $15,000?

A.

No.

(R. 180 at 30)
20.

The Plaintiff Kairle Terry also testified, as to the December 29, 2008,
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telephone conversation, as follows:
Q

Tell me what - to the best of your recollection, tell me what he
communicated during that phone conversation that took place in
December of 2008.

A.

As I heard him discuss it with Mr. McConkie, he said, no, it was not
acceptable. What was being offered, he would not accept the
settlement, as he understood it, and - it was just - it was a negative
answer.

Q

Prior to this December conversation, had you ever personally heard of
the figure of $15,000 being proposed as a settlement from your
lawyer?

A

No.

Q

Did you ever see a settlement agreement - a written settlement
agreement?

A

No.

(R. 180 at 34)
21.

The Plaintiff Glade Terry testified as follows:

Q

Did you ever communicate to your lawyer that you would accept the
sum of $15,000 as and for settlement in full of your case against Dr.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Bacon?
No, I did not.

Do you remember - was it in December of 2008 that you first heard which was about a year and a half ago - first heard that they had
offered $15,000 to settle this case?
No, it was before that.
Was it?
Yes.
And what did you tell Mr. McConkie at that time?
I told him - he explained what the figures amounted to and I told him
I could not accept that.
What did he tell you about that?
He told me that it would be $15,000 and he would need $9,000 and I
would end up with $6,000. And I says, "I cannot do that, not with all
my injuries."
The discussion that you had with him in December that he claims is
the time that you settled this case, did you tell him at any time during
the course of that conversation that you would even entertain that sum
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as a settlement?
A

No. I told him we could not accept that.

Q

Did you have another conversation with counsel, Mr. McConkie,
again about the settlement?

A

We talked several times.

Q

Do you remember when the next one was?

A

No, I don't.

Q

And the - the conversation that took place after the December
conversation, was that some time in January of 2009?

A

It would have been, yes, when we returned from Mexico.

Q

Did he - did Mr. McConkie tell you why he called you?

A

Yes. He wanted to cash the check.

Q

And what did you tell him?

A

I told him, "Don't cash that check for $15,000, that's not enough."

180at40-42)
22.

The Plaintiff Glade Terry also testified as follows:

Q

And when you received this telephone conversation from [Mr.
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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McConkie] initially about settlement, the $15,000 didn't come up, did
it?
Yes, it did, and I was dissatisfied with Mr. McConkie's practice and
that's when I went to Mr. Jim Haskins.

Isn't it true that there were discussions about the probability - the
possibility of settling the case and a certain amount was not yet
determined?
Yes, that was said, uh-huh.
And you were willing to enter into settlement negotiations, were you
not?
Not at that time.
For any amount?
For no amount, that's right.
All right. And so what you're asking, then - or what you're telling us
now is that you never really authorized Mr. McConkie to settle for
any amount?
That is correct.
And so when Mr. McConkie presented the $15,000 and said, "Will
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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you accept this, you said, without any equivocation, "No"?
A

That is correct, I said "No."

R. 180 at 42-43.
23.

Mr. McConkie then testified as follows:

Q

You've heard the testimony from Mr. Terry wherein he absolutely
denies that he accepted the sum of $15,000 as a settlement. And just
please respond.

A

. . . I remember that it was a difficult decision, and that was one of
the reasons I wanted to talk to him and give him some time to think
about it. And my recollection - and I noted it in my notes - was that
although it was a difficult situation, he agreed that I could take that
amount and pay off the costs, which were about $8,000 at that point,
and essentially give him the balance. And that's my best recollection.

(R. 180 at 47)
24.

The Trial Court determined that Mr. McConkie's testimony was

credible and also that it was corroborated by his reference to his notes, which the
Court stated were admissible as "past recollection recorded. The Court also
determined that Mr. McConkie's testimony was corroborated by his telephone call
to opposing counsel, Mr. Williams, "and then the almost contemporaneous
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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remittal of a settlement check some 11 days after the December 29th telephone
conversation. " Based on these findings and rulings, the Court determined that
"there was authorization given to Mr. McConkie by Mr. Terry to accept a
settlement offer of $15,000 from the - from this one defendant [Glade Terry]".
(R. 180 at 54)
25.

The Trial Court also determined that Mr. McConkie spoke only to

Glade Terry on the phone, and not to Kairle Terry. (R. 180 at 56) Ultimately
however, as to her claims, the Court (1) ruled that Kairle Terry's claim for
consortium was derivative of the claims of Glade Terry; and (2) denied Kairle
Terry's informal request to amend the complaint to add a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, upon the ground that any such claim was "legally
insufficient and futile." (R. 148-149)
26.

By letter dated October 12, 2010, Plaintiffs former counsel, James

McConkie, submitted a letter to Plaintiffs new counsel asserting that, pursuant to
his attorney lien in the case, the Plaintiffs new counsel was required to "disburse
$14,935.42 to Parker & McConkie from the funds that Plaintiffs acquired through
settlement of the above-referenced matter." Since the total amount of the putative
settlement check was $15,000.00, if Mr. McConkie's attorney lien is honored in
the amount claimed, the resulting amount to be distributed to the Plaintiffs would
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be$64.58. 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
THE PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL IN
THIS CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE.

The Trial Court's allowing of the testimony of the Plaintiffs' former counsel
in opposition to his former client's violated the attorney-client privilege, was
erroneous as a matter of law, and should not have been permitted.
n.

THE RULE IN REESE V. TINGEY CONSTRUCTION
WHICH REFUSED TO ENFORCE MEDIATED
SETTLEMENTS UNLESS THOSE AGREEMENTS
ARE REDUCED TO WRITING, SHOULD BE
EXTENDED AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE.

Settlement agreements in mediation which are not reduced to writing are not
enforceable under the Utah Supreme Court's Ruling in Reese v. Tingey
Construction, 111 P.3d 605 (Utah 2008), and that doctrine should be extended to
the settlement in this case inasmuch as the parties all agreed to submit this case to
binding arbitration and such arbitration awards are by law required to be reduced
to writing.

3

The Plaintiffs have or will shortly move the District Court to supplement the
record herein with the letter from Mr. McConkie pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(h).
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III.

THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS
REGARDING THE PUTATIVE SETTLEMENT OF THIS
CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES, WHERE THE
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES ARE PERMANENT AND
SUBSTANTIAL, WHILE THE NET RECOVERY TO
THEM IS ONLY $64.58, AND THE PARTIES ARE IN
FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT WHETHER ANY
SETTLEMENT WAS ACTUALLY ENTERED INTO.

The parties have diametrically opposed views whether any settlement
actually occurred in this case. Because the Court made no finding of any kind
determining that any party was disingenuous, lying, or acting in bad faith, it is
clear error to conclude that the parties in fact entered into a settlement agreement,
because there was no meeting of the minds regarding the fundamental question
whether any settlement was ever reached.
IV.

THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF'S
INJURIES AND THE RECOVERY OF ONLY $64.58
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PUTATIVE
SETTLEMENT HEREIN IS OUTRAGEOUS AND THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL
COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DISPARITY
SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT.

The Trial Court should be permitted to determine whether the disparity
between the Plaintiffs actual injuries and the putative settlement which essentially
deprived the Plaintiff of any recovery at all shocks the conscience of the Court.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
THE PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL IN
THIS CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE.

In overruling the Plaintiffs' objection to the testimony of their former
attorney regarding the alleged existence of a settlement agreement, the Trial Court
concluded that
by stating - at least raising this issue of whether Mr. McConkie was
authorized to enter into this agreement, that the Plaintiff has indeed
put that - put Mr. McConkie's performance as an attorney in issue, at
least in small part here. And that would justify going into the matter
and it would not be precluded under Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. So I will allow the questioning.
In so ruling, the Court erred as a matter of law. First, of course, the Plaintiffs did
not put their attorney's conduct in issue; the Respondents did. Second, under Rule
504, "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating
the rendition of professional legal services. . . ." This broad general privilege
protects from disclosure a wide array of attorney-client communications. And the
Utah statute governing attorney-client privilege is even more emphatic:
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An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to the attorney or any
advice given regarding the communication in the course of the
professional employment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-137 (2008).
As the Utah Supreme Court has noted,
The attorney-client privilege "is intended to encourage candor
between attorney and client and promote the best possible
representation of the client." Gold Standard, Inc. v. American
Barrick Resources (USA), Inc., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990). It is
the oldest of the common law privileges protecting confidential
communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981) [citations omitted]. The privilege is recognized in Rule 504 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence as well as by statute . . . .
Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 982-983 (Utah 1999). The attorney-client privilege
is universally recognized as one which protects statements made in settlement
negotiations from disclosure. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 934 So.2d 1073,
1079 (Ala. Ct. App. 2005) (referring to "the privileged nature of settlement
negotiations"); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332
F.3d 976, 977 (6th Cir. 2003) ("statements made in furtherance of settlement are
privileged and protected from third party discovery"); Russo v. Nagel, 817 A.2d
426, 433 (N. J. Super A.D. 2003) ("statements made during settlement
negotiations are privileged").
Rule 504(d) sets forth five narrow exceptions to the privilege. None of
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these are applicable to the present case and thus the Trial Court erred in
determining that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the testimony of the
Plaintiffs former attorney offered in support of the opposing parties.
Rule 504(d)(3) provides that no privilege exists "as to a communication
relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to
the lawyer. Here, however, the Plaintiffs have not at any time alleged any breach
of duty by their former lawyer to them4, no action has been filed against the
lawyer by the clients and, indeed, the issue regarding the settlement was raised by
the defendants herein, not by the Plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, the
exceptions of Rule 504(d) have no applicability to the disclosures made by the
former attorney for the clients because the clients have taken no affirmative steps
to waive the privilege, and their attorney should not have been permitted to testify.
See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 893 N.E. 2d 487 (Ohio 2008) ("attorney may not testify
regarding a communication made to him by his client"); Hawgood v. Hawgood,
294 N.E. 2d 681, 685 (Ohio Com. PL 1973) (same); Shongv. Farmer's &
Merchants' State Bank, 70 N.W. 2d 907, 910 (N.D. 1955) ("where the relationship
of attorney and client exists, the attorney may not testify in an action unless the
4

Indeed, as noted by the Plaintiffs new counsel during the hearing, "we have
never assailed Mr. McConkie's conduct in any way, other than it's my client's position
that he did not settle this case, a major malpractice case, for $15,000."
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privilege has been waived"); Patella v. State, 29A S.W. 571 (Tex. Crim. App.
1927).
In Utah, it has been held that Utah's Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
protects against disclosure of mediation communications, and thus the appellant's
attorney could not be deposed regarding the content of the mediation. Reese v.
Tingey Construction, 111 P.3d 605, 607 (Utah 2008). Notably, the original policy
reasons behind this rule as to alternative dispute resolution is strikingly similar to
the Utah Supreme Court's statement of the policy reasons justifying the attorneyclient privilege quoted above. With regard to alternative dispute resolution, Utah
has by statute provided that mediation proceedings are designed to "encourage
informal and confidential exchange among the persons present to facilitate
resolution of the dispute." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8. 5
Before the Trial Court, the Defendants relied upon Buffalo Wings Factory,
Inc., v. Mohd, 622 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E. D. Va. 2007), as support for their position
that the attorney-client privilege in that case was waived. That case, however, was
a clear case of "cold feet," inasmuch as the District Court had actually entered an
earlier and voluntary consent order which outlined the express terms of the

Repealed and replaced by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-203(2)(b) (2008), which
contains similar language regarding the confidentiality of mediation proceedings.
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settlement. Subsequently, the Defendants sought relief from the consent order
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and - unlike the
situation in the present case - the Defendants affirmatively argued that "their
attorney, Martin Mooradian . . . lied to them and entered into the Consent Order
without Defendants' permission." Id. at 329. As a direct result of that affirmative
attack on their attorney, the Court ruled that the attorney-client privilege had been
waived, because under federal law, "if a client assails his attorney's conduct of the
case . . . the privilege as to confidential communications is waived, since the
attorney . . . has a right to defend himself under the circumstances." Id. Here,
there has been no such affirmative attack on the Plaintiffs former attorney; rather,
the former attorney, in support of the respondents, has attacked the Plaintiffs
recollection of the settlement negotiations. The difference is that in Buffalo
Wings, the defendants committed affirmative acts which amounted to a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege; while the Plaintiffs here have undertaken no such
affirmative acts. For this reason, and because the Buffalo Wings case involves an
interpretation and analysis of federal law and not Utah law, that case is
distinguishable and inapposite.
For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court erred in
allowing the plaintiffs' former attorney to testify against them and over their
-22Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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objection.
II.

THE RULE IN REESE V. TINGEY CONSTRUCTION,
WHICH REFUSED TO ENFORCE MEDIATED
SETTLEMENTS UNLESS THOSE AGREEMENTS ARE
REDUCED TO WRITING, SHOULD BE EXTENDED
AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE.

Confidentiality of settlement agreements was of key importance to the
Court's decision in Reese v. Tingey Construction, 111 P.3d 605 (Utah 2008),
which held that oral agreements not reduced to writing in mediated cases were not
enforceable in Utah courts. It is respectfully submitted that the Reese rule should
be extended and applied to this case and the alleged oral agreement should not be
enforced.
In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that "[a] court cannot
enforce the terms of an oral agreement reached in mediation without requiring
parties to disclose, and the court to consider, confidential settlement negotiations.
Absent the existence of an exception, we are not prepared to invade the
confidentiality protections afforded parties to mediation in this manner. A rule
permitting courts to enforce only written mediation agreements provides a court
with the means to use its power to enforce the terms of a written agreement or to
determine whether the terms of the written agreement have been violated, without
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requiring it to delve into the confidential process that led to the creation of the
agreement." Id. at 609.
The Court noted that the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act as it was then
written did not absolutely require that settlement agreements in mediation be
reduced to writing, but nevertheless the Court established a prospective and
hardline rule that mere oral agreements reached in mediation would not be
enforced. Reese v. Tingey Construction, 111 P.3d 605, 609 (Utah 2008).
The instant case was not, of course, one ultimately involving arbitrators who
rendered any decision, but this is in spite the fact that all parties agreed that the
arbitration agreement signed by the Plaintiff Glade Terry would be applied herein,
and in spite of the fact that the Court entered an Order requiring the Plaintiff to
proceed immediately to arbitration as to at least one of the defendants. (R. 33)
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the Reese requirement
that mediated settlements must be reduced to writing to be enforceable ought to be
applied to this case. First, the parties all agreed to arbitrate their disputes.
Second, the alleged oral settlement agreement was never reduced to writing, and
the parties now dispute whether such an agreement was ever authorized at all by
the Plaintiffs. Third, the same policy reasons underlying the Utah Supreme
Court's insistence on written settlement stipulations in the context of mediation
-24Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

apply with special force to the facts of this case. That is because what happened
here - with the plaintiffs attorney testifying against them and on behalf of their
opponents - is the very danger the Utah Supreme Court sought so resolutely to
avoid, and the confidentiality requirements of the attorney-client privilege were
invaded as a result.
Finally, it should be noted that the actual Arbitration Agreement signed by
the Plaintiff, Glade Terry, provides that as part of the arbitration process the
parties could "resolve any claim by . . . working directly with each other to try and
find a solution that resolves the Claim." (R. 13) The arbitration agreement further
provides that "the decision shall be consistent with the Utah Uniform Arbitration
Act."6 (R. 13) That Act plainly contemplates that decisions pursuant to the Act
shall be in writing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-101, et seq. (2008). Thus, Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-11-120, governing awards, requires that "an arbitrator shall
make a record of an award. The record must be signed or otherwise authenticated
by any arbitrator who concurs with the award. The arbitrator or the arbitration

6

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-110 (2008) provides that "[a] person initiates an
arbitration proceeding by giving notice in a record to the other parties to the agreement to
arbitrate in the manner agreed between the parties." It is submitted that the Plaintiffs'
Reply to Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration (R. 27), and the Stipulated Motion
to Stay Proceedings and to Enforce Arbitration Agreement (R.30) triggered the
provisions of the Act and initiated the arbitration proceeding.
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organization shall give notice of the award, including a copy of the award, to each
party to the arbitration proceeding." This is part of the procedure that all parties the plaintiffs and all defendants - agreed to. Once the arbitration process was
initiated, the arbitration provisions themselves mandated that any award be in
writing. That was not done in this case, and the result was a disregarding of the
parties' stipulated motion to stay the proceedings and enforce the arbitration
agreement, and a putative oral agreement which the parties cannot even agree
existed.
For the above reasons, this case should be remanded to the Trial Court with
directions to Order the parties to submit to the arbitration process, which will
result in the written agreement contemplated by the Uniform Arbitration Act.

III.

THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS REGARDING
THE PUTATIVE SETTLEMENT OF THIS CASE BETWEEN
THE PARTIES, WHERE THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES ARE
PERMANENT AND SUBSTANTIAL, WHILE THE NET
RECOVERY TO THEM IS ONLY $64.58, AND THE PARTIES
ARE IN FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT WHETHER ANY
SETTLEMENT WAS ACTUALLY ENTERED INTO.

The parties have diametrically opposed views concerning the existence of
any settlement agreement in this case. The only evidence offered on this issue
consists of (1) the conflicting affidavits of the Plaintiff Glade Terry and the
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attorney for the Defendants R. 71, 91; and (2) the conflicting testimony of the
plaintiffs former attorney, Mr. McConkie, and the plaintiffs concerning whether
or not any agreement was reached at all (R. 180 at 17, et seq.; R. 180 at 23, et seq.;
R. 180 at 44, et seq.) Basic to contract principles is the requirement that there
must be a "meeting of the minds" in order to form a contract. See, e.g., DCH
Holdings, LLC v. Nielsen, 220 P.3d 178, 183 fn 3 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). The
Court below made no finding that any party was disingenuous, lying, or acting in
bad faith in relating their sworn recollections concerning settlement discussions.
Under these circumstances, it is clear error to conclude, as did the trial court, that
the plaintiffs agreed to accept the sum of $15,000 for their substantial injuries.
There can have been no meeting of the minds between the parties, inasmuch as at
least two essential terms were in dispute: (1) whether there was any settlement
agreement at all; and (2) whether, if so, it was for the sum of $15,000, which
would have left the Plaintiffs with virtually nothing after taking into consideration
Mr. McConkie's expenses and attorney fees. Because there was no meeting of the
minds, there also was no settlement agreement, and the Plaintiffs should be
entitled to have their malpractice claims heard on the merits.
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IV.

THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF'S
INJURIES AND THE RECOVERY OF ONLY $64.58
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PUTATIVE
SETTLEMENT HEREIN IS OUTRAGEOUS AND THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL
COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DISPARITY
SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT.

The material allegations contained in the Complaint in this case stand
undenied by the Defendants. Therein, it has been alleged that the Plaintiff, over a
prolonged period of time, experienced consistent nerve, back and leg pain and
other back and leg pain for which he sought an array of medical treatments,
including pain medications, and nerve block injections. (R. 7) At the best of
Defendant C. William Bacon, M. D., the Plaintiff underwent back surgery, which
was unsuccessful. (R. 6-7) When the Plaintiffs physician and the other
defendants failed to properly evaluate the Plaintiffs continuing complaints to
them, his condition deteriorated, until the pain became even more severe and the
Plaintiff permanently lost sensation and motion in his lower extremities. (R. 6)
The Plaintiff then sought advice help from Dr. John Braun at the University of
Utah, who advised him that the bone graft performed by Defendant C. William
Bacon, M.D., surrounding Plaintiffs nerve root in the foramen and extraforaminal area may be causing Plaintiffs paralysis, physical symptoms and pain.
(R. 5) This second surgery also did not relieve the Plaintiffs symptoms, however,
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and now he continues to experience permanent paralysis in his right lower
extremities for which he uses a brace for foot drop. He also suffers from severe
and unrelenting pain in his lower right extremities. (R. 5) Given these substantial
injuries, even assuming there was a settlement agreement for $15,000, virtually the
entire sum would be expended on the Plaintiffs attorney fees and costs, leaving
him with no compensation whatsoever for his injuries and his continuing pain.
It is submitted that the essential concession of the case by the Plaintiffs
former attorney is an outrageous injustice which ought to shock the conscience of
the court, permit the decision below to be vacated, and allow the parties to pursue
their remedies in mediation. Courts have not hesitated to grant such relief where
the disparity between the injuries suffered and the actual recovery for those
injuries is outrageously less than would be necessary to make the plaintiff whole.
See, e.g., Young Candy & Tobacco Co. v. Montoya, 372 P.2d 703, 707 (Ariz.
1962) (damages adjustable if they are "so manifestly unfair, unreasonable and
outrageous as to shock the conscience of the Court"); United Oklahoma Bank v.
Moss, 793 P.2d 1359, 1364 (Okla. 1990) (sale price is so grossly inadequate that it
shocks the conscience fo the Court); In re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 558,
564 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346 (Ark. 2003)
(verdict can be set aside where it is so great as to shock the conscience of the
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court); Am Trim, LLC

v. Oracle Corp., 383 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2004)

(compensatory damages award can be set aside if it is "so excessive or inadequate
as to shock the conscience of the court).
Here, the parties have not addressed this issue because the Trial Court heard
only the issue as to whether or not a settlement had been reached. The Plaintiff
should be allowed to put on his evidence to show that the award is so inadequate
as to shock the conscience of the court.

{

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's
enforcement of a putative settlement agreement herein should be reversed, and this
case should be remanded to the Trial Court with directions that the case should be
submitted to arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement executed by the
parties.
DATED this_ l i t h _ day of April, 2011.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLADE TERRY and KAIRLE TERRY,
Plaintiffs,
v.

C. WILLIAM BACON, M.D.; CENTRAL
UTAH CLINIC, P.C. and UTAH VALLEY
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF
CASE
Civil No: 070402917
Judge Samuel D. McVey

Defendants.

The Court on June 22, 2010, in its Order Enforcing Settlement Agreement, reserved
judgment as to Mrs. Kairle Terry's claims for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The Court requested the parties to provide information concerning the
relevant laws for each claim. Defendants C. William Bacon, M.D., Central Utah Clinic, P.C. and
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center submitted a supplemental briefing in support of the motion
to enforce settlement agreement. Ms. Terry did not respond. The Court, having carefully
reviewed the briefing, makes the following Order.
II. Analysis
A. Relevant Law regarding Whether the Claim for Loss of Consortium by Mrs. Terry is
Derivative of the Claims of Mr. Terry
Whether a settlement agreement entered into by an injured spouse bars the non-injured
spouse's derivative loss of consortium claim is an issue of first impression in Utah. The courts in
a majority of jurisdictions have held that a release signed by the injured spouse does not deprive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the non-injured spouse of his or her loss of consortium claim. 2-11 Damages in Tort Action §
11.02(e) (2010). The courts in a minority of jurisdictions have "held that the consortium claim is
purely derivative and wholly dependent on the primary claim, and is extinguished upon the
termination of the primary claim by settlement or release." Id. Furthermore, "[i]n some
jurisdictions in which the claim is regarded as 'derivative,' it is treated as 'independent' insofar
as it is subject to special defenses not available against the injured person."
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS,

RESTATEMENT

§ 48 (1982).

In Utah, a non-injured spouse's action for loss of consortium is created by statute. Utah
law states that a "spouse's action for loss of consortium shall be derivative from the cause of
action existing in behalf of the injured person." UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 30-2-1 l(5)(a) (2010). As a

loss of consortium claim clearly is derivative, the question that remains is whether the claim
should be treated as "derivative" and "dependent," such as to be purely derivative, or
"derivative" and "independent." The former approach would bar Mrs. Terry's loss of consortium
claim, while the latter would allow it. As a claim for loss of consortium is created by statute, the
Court interprets the statute and analyzes any relevant case law to discover which approach was
intended.
When interpreting a statute, this Court's purpose "is to evince the true intent and purpose
of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, P 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The "best evidence" of a statute's meaning "is the plain language of the statute itself."
Id. However, the "plain language analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into individual
words and subsections in isolation; our interpretation of a statute requires that each part or
section be 'construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole? " Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, P9 (Utah 2010) (quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007
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UT 45, P 7, 162 P.3d 1099 (emphasis added)) (quoting State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, P 54, 63
P.3d 621). Significantly, " 'the purpose of the statute' has an influence on the plain meaning of a
statute." Anderson, 2010 UT at P9 (quoting R&R Indus. Park, LLC. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Guar, Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, PP 23, 36, 199 P.3d 917).
Analyzing the statute as a "harmonious whole," as well as the purpose of the statute, and
the sparse relevant case law in Utah, the Court holds that a loss of consortium claim is "purely
derivative and wholly dependent" on the injured spouse's claim and is barred by an injured
spouse's settlement of his or her claims. 2-11 Damages in Tort Action § 11.02(e). The Court's
reasoning follows.
First, as already discussed, Utah law defines a loss of consortium claim as derivative
from the underlying injury claim. A thorough analysis of the statute as a whole suggests that the
loss of consortium claim is derivative and dependent, so as to be purely derivative. Significantly,
the statute strongly links the underlying injury claim with the loss of consortium claim in several
important aspects. For example, the loss of consortium claim "may not exist in cases where the
injured person would not have a cause of action" (UTAH

CODE ANN,

§ 30-2-11(5)), the two

actions must be pled at the same time {Id. at § 30-2-1 l(4)(a)), their statutes of limitations run
concurrently (Id. at § 30-2-11(3)), the loss of consortium claim is "subject to the same defenses,
limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person," (Id. at §
30-2-11(4)( b)), both claims are subject to reduction through comparative fault (Id. at § 30-211(6)), and the sum of the damages for both claims cannot exceed any applicable statutory limit
for noneconomic claims. (Id. at § 30-2-11(7)).
The legislative history discusses the purpose of the statute, further illuminating its
meaning. The purpose of the statute "is to compensate spouses of injured persons for losses
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suffered by the spouse." House Floor Debate, General Sess. HB0320 (1997). However, the
statute was to "limit the availability of [loss of consortium] to only the most serious cases/'
preventing a dramatic increase in litigation. Id. Furthermore, the bill sponsor emphasized that
"no other state in the country would limit the remedy in this way." Id.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals of Utah has held that a non-injured spouse's loss of
consortium claim ceased to exist when the underlying injury claim failed. Fox v. Brigham Young
Univ., Inc., 2007 UT App 406, P24 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). The Court quoted the Utah statute, •
reasoning that a "spouse's action for loss of consortium . .. [is] derivative from the cause of
action in behalf of the injured person[,] and . . . it may not exist in cases where the injured person
would not have a cause of action." Id. This Court sees no reason why the result would be
different when an underlying injury claim fails and when an underlying injury claim is settled. In
both cases, the underlying injury claim has been extinguished, and a derivative loss of
consortium claim cannot be maintained.
Viewing the provisions of the statute as a harmonious whole and in light of the statute's
legislative history and relevant case law, this Court views barring a non-injured spouse's loss of
consortium claim after the underlying injury claim has been settled as most compatible with Utah
law. Thus, Mr. Terry's settlement of his claims bars Mrs. Terry's loss of consortium claim.

B. Whether the Claim of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress can be Sustained as a
Matter of Law at this Point in the Proceeding
The Court denies Mrs. Terry leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that after a
party has filed responsive pleadings, "a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or
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by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
However, "a party may not amend a complaint to add a claim that is legally insufficient or
futile." Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, P33 (Utah 2003) (quoting Kasco
Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92-93 (Utah 1992)).
The Supreme Court of Utah adopted the test for negligent infliction of emotion distress
outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785
(Utah 1988). "Subsection (2) of section 313 is clear in its requirement that those seeking to
recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing injury to others must be within the zone.of
danger created by the defendant's breach of duty." Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, 830 P.2d 236, 240
(Utah 1992). The Supreme Court of Utah has also noted "that the rules in section 313 have 'no
application where the emotional distress arises solely because of harm or peril to a third person,
and the negligence of the actor has not threatened the plaintiff with bodily harm in any other
way.' " Id. Additionally, "[a] plaintiff cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress unless the plaintiff is a direct victim of the defendant's negligence. This rule applies
regardless of whether the plaintiffs emotional distress resulted from fear for her own safety or
from witnessing harm to another. That is, the [defendant's' negligence must have placed [the
plaintiff] in actual physical peril for her to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress."
Straub v. Fisher & Paykel Health Care, 1999 UT 102, P14 (Utah 1999).
In this case, Mrs. Terry's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is legally
insufficient and futile. Mrs. Terry's alleged emotional distress "arises solely because of harm or
peril" to her husband, and the defendant's alleged negligence "has not threatened [Mrs. Terry]
with bodily harm in any other way." Hansen, 830 P.2d at 240. Basically, Mrs. Terry is not "a
direct victim of the defendant's [alleged] negligence." Straub, 1999 UT at P14. The defendant's
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alleged negligence never placed Mrs. Terry "in actual physical peril." Id. Therefore, the Court
denies Mrs. Terry leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
III. Conclusion
The Court bars Mrs. Terry's loss of consortium claim because it is purely derivative on
Mr. Terry's settled underlying injury claim. Additionally, the Court denies Mrs. Terry leave to
amend the complaint to add a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because even if
it was it allowed, it would fail as a matter of law, making it legally insufficient and futile.
There being no other claims pending, this matter is dismissed.

DATED this t 9 of

^zJ*~h

, 2010

BY THE COURT:

Safltfiel D. McVey '
District Court Judge
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4TH DISTRICT,
fWEOFUTAhJ
U1AH COUNTY

R. Scott Williams #3498
BriantS. Piatt, #11819
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Respondents
C. William Bacon, M.D., and
Central Utah Clinic, P.C.
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
swilliams@strongandhanni.com
bplatt@strongandhanni.com

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GLADE TERRY and KAIRLE TERRY,

;

Claimants,

])
)

ORDER ENFORCING SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

;)
;
;1

Civil No. 070402917

vs.
C. WILLIAM BACON, M.D.; CENTRAL
UTAH CLINIC, P.C. and UTAH VALLEY
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Respondents.

Judge: Samuel McVey

]

Defendants' Motion to Enforce an oral settlement agreement in the sum of $15,000 came
up for oral argument and evidentiary hearing on May 10, 2010 with James Haskins appearing for
Plaintiffs and R. Scott Williams appearing for Defendants.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

¥

Defendants initially called as a witness, James W. McConkie, the former attorney for
Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs objected on the grounds of attorney/client privilege. Consequently, oral
argument was heard concerning the ability of Mr. McConkie to testify with respect to issues
involving any prior settlement.
Having heard the arguments of counsel, the Court ruled as a matter of law that Plaintiffs
had placed communications with their attorney "at issue" in this judicial proceeding and
therefore the Court deems that the attorney/client privilege is waived to the extent of testimony
presented on the issue of whether a settlement agreement had been reached between Plaintiffs
and Defendants through their individual attorneys. Consequently, Mr. McConkie was permitted
to testify with respect to evidence regarding the possibility of a settlement that may have existed
in this case.
The Court having otherwise heard the testimony of the witnesses presented at the hearing
and reviewed the memoranda and listened to the arguments of counsel; Now Therefore It Is
Hereby Ordered as follows:
1. Settlement Enforced as to Mr. Glade Terry
The settlement agreement is hereby enforced and the Court rules that the parties did
agree to settle the above-mentioned case between Plaintiff Glade Terry and Defendants Dr.
William Bacon and the Central Utah Clinic for the total amount of $15,000. Consequently, the
settlement will be effective as of early January 2009, and Mr. Terry is ordered to sign the original
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Release and Settlement Agreement forwarded to Mr. McConkie on January 9, 2009. The Court
reaches the ruling for the following reasons:
a. The Court finds that the testimony of James W. McConkie is credible and
corroborated in part with his notes that he used to record the substance of the conversations
between Mr. Terry and Mr. McConkie. These notes are admissible as present recollection
recorded under Rule 803 (5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Court is persuaded Mr.
McConkie obtained the requisite authorization to settle the claim for $15,000 and that Mr. Glade
Terry did express intent to be bound by Mr. McConkie's actions in accepting that settlement
offer of $15,000.
b. The subsequent telephone call testified to by the Affidavit of R. Scott Williams
wherein he learned that the settlement offer had been accepted by the Plaintiffs and consequently
ordered the settlement check, which was ultimately delivered to Mr. McConkie, along with a
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal of the case, also persuades the Court of the existence of the
settlement and that a "meeting of the minds" occurred with respect to the settlement sum of
$15,000.
c. There is a long history in Utah law that oral agreements to settle should be enforced as
a matter of public policy, and that settlement agreements are favored.
d. There was not sufficient testimony about the lack of competency on the part of Mr.
Terry.
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2. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement Reserved as to Mrs. Kairle Terry
The Court hereby reserves for the present, the issue of whether a settlement agreement
was reached between Plaintiff Kairle Terry and Defendants. The Court has asked the parties to
provide information concerning the following issues with respect to that portion of the Motion,,
including:
1. Relevant law with respect to whether the claim for loss of consortium by Mrs. Terry is
derivative of the claims of Mr. Terry; and
2. Whether the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress can be sustained as a
matter of law at this point in the proceeding.

DATED this jZZ^^y

ofMay; 2010.
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

James C. Haskins (#1406)
Thomas N. Thompson (#3243)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Attorney for Appellant
136 East South Temple, Suite 1420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0234
Facsimile:
(801) 539-5210

MAY26 2011

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GLADE TERRY and KAIRLE TERRY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE OF BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS
Trial Court No. 070402917

C. WILLIAM BACON, M.D, CENTRAL UTAH
CLINIC, P.C, and UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER,

Appellate Court No. 20100893-SC

Respondents and Appellees.
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs Brief of Appellants was
served on the 26th day of May, 2011, by HAND DELIVERY to the offices of the attorney for
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, as follows:
Brandon B. Hobbs
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys at Law
299 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
DATED this 26th day of May, 2011.

lUbL^lLL
^omaS/N. Thompson
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i hereby certily liiat true and correct copies of the foregoing ^.ertilicutc ol hcr\ ice ol Hrk
of A ppcllants was served on the 26th day of May, 2011, as follows:
0 \ HAND DELIVERY TO:
Brandon B. Hobbs
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys at Law
209 South Main Street. Suite 1500
Silt .'.akeCitv. Utal- S-M 10-2465

R. Scott Williams
>;:-iantS. Platl
Si'RONG&HANN,
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Sail Lake Citv. I Tib $4180
DATED this 26th day of May, 2011.
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